Affirmation, Judgment, and Epistemic Theodicy in Descartes and Spinoza by Lin, Martin
 Both Descartes and Spinoza develop their theories of judgment in the 
service of what may be called epistemic theodicy, in that they seek to 
reconcile human error with the existence of a perfect God. They have, 
however, very different conceptions of God and the relationship of the 
human mind to that God and, therefore, develop very different concep-
tions of judgment. 
 Descartes’s God is a transcendent being in whose image the human 
mind has been made and whose commandments we seek to fulfi l. 
Human error is compatible with the existence of a perfect God because 
we are free to use our cognitive capacities well or poorly. In particular, 
judgment (affi rming, denying, or suspending judgment with respect to 
the content of an idea) is a matter of a free act of will. God has given 
us a faculty that allows us to discover a rule for applying our free will 
in judgment so that we will never affi rm a false proposition and that 
allows us to unerringly affi rm certain truths. And, thus, when we err, 
the responsibility for error falls to us and not God. 
 For Spinoza, unlike Descartes, God is not a transcendent being; rather, 
he is the one substance in which all else, the human mind included, 
inheres. Indeed, for Spinoza, the human mind is an idea in God’s infi nite 
intellect and constitutes God’s knowledge of the human body. This entails 
that every idea in the human mind is identical to an idea in God. Since all 
ideas, insofar as they are in God, are true and, indeed, known, all ideas, in 
and of themselves, are affi rmed. This thesis has at least two troubling con-
sequences. First, it seems diffi cult to reconcile with the apparent existence 
of cognitive attitudes such as denial and suspending judgment. Second, it 
appears to entail that all ideas are believed. 
 In this paper, I begin by setting out Descartes’s account of judgment 
and how it accomplishes an epistemic theodicy. I then discuss Spinoza’s 
offi cial argument for the claim that every idea is affi rmed and note certain 
diffi culties with it that prompt recent interpretations according to which 
Spinoza’s notion of affi rmation is reducible to his notion of conatus or 
striving for self-preservation. I argue that such interpretations must be 
rejected on the grounds that they fail to preserve the connection between 
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affi rmation and truth that Spinoza endorses. I suggest instead that, for 
Spinoza, every idea is affi rmed in the sense that every idea purports to 
represent the world as it really is. Striving for self-preservation does not 
ground this affi rmation, but it looks to it for guidance so that each idea 
pushes us to act in ways that would be conducive to our self-preservation 
if it were true. When different ideas push us in different directions, how 
we act is a function of the respective degrees of power associated with 
each idea, considered as an individual in its own right. I conclude by argu-
ing that Spinoza’s notion of affi rmation should be regarded as a technical 
one that is unconnected with the ordinary conception of belief, which, I 
argue, plays no role in Spinoza’s psychology. 
 1. Descartes’s Theory 
 In the Third Meditation, Descartes proposes the following rule: whatever 
I clearly and distinctly perceive is true. 1 But before he accepts this rule, he 
must prove that God exists and is no deceiver because he needs to fore-
close the possibility that God designed me in such a way that my faculties 
mislead me and what I clearly and distinctly perceive is false. 2 Proving 
the existence of such a God is the principal task of the Third Meditation. 
 At the start of the Fourth Meditation, Descartes confronts the worry 
that he has proved too much. If the existence of a non-deceiving God 
gives us a reason to trust our clear and distinct perception, wouldn’t it 
also give us a reason to trust all of our perceptions? 3 After all, if God is no 
deceiver, wouldn’t he design us in such a way that our cognitive capacities 
never deceived us? This question is especially troublesome to Descartes 
because he thinks that our sensory perception of the world provides us 
with ample opportunities to err: it presents the world to us as having 
qualities that it does not, in fact, have. It presents, for example, an apple 
to me as red, fragrant, and sweet when in fact it is none of those things. 
(At least it is none of those things in the way they are presented to me in 
sense perception, that is, as intrinsic properties of the apple distinct from 
its geometrical ones.) Rather, the only properties that the apple truly has 
are modes of extension: size, shape, and motion. Why then did God, 
who is no deceiver, design me in such a way that my sensory capacities 
consistently give misleading testimony? 
 This is where his theory of judgment comes in, which is, as we will see, 
designed to show that we, and not God, are responsible for our errors. 
For Descartes, the mind is composed of two faculties or powers: intellect 
and volition. 4 The intellect is that aspect of my mind that accounts for 
its ability to represent the world and various possibilities concerning it. 
For example, sense perception, memory, perception of universals, and 
essences are all ideas that a mind possesses in virtue of the intellect. The 
will is the aspect of my mind that accounts for my ability to take certain 
attitudes to the contents represented by my ideas. For example, affi rming, 
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denying, wanting, and fearing are all volitions that a mind possesses in 
virtue of the will. 
 Merely having an idea, all by itself, cannot constitute an error, even if 
that idea represents what is not the case. Only if we affi rm an idea that 
represents what is not the case or deny an idea of what is the case do we 
err. 5 When we affi rm or deny an idea, we make a judgment. Judgment, 
thus, for Descartes, involves the cooperation of two distinct mental facul-
ties: intellect and volition. 
 It is useful to contrast Descartes on this score with some of his scholastic 
predecessors, such as Aquinas, who thought that (apart from the special 
case of religious faith) judgment was an act of the intellect alone. Accord-
ing to this scholastic tradition, the fi rst operation of the intellect involves 
cognizing accidental and substantial form. 6 By themselves, the representa-
tions of these forms are neither true nor false, but when we relate them 
to each other by a process that Aquinas calls  combining and  separating , 
we form judgments, which are either true or false. 7 For example, the fi rst 
operation of the intellect may abstract from sense perception of a red 
apple a representation of the accidental form of red and a representation 
of the substantial form of an apple. A judgment results when I combine 
my representation of redness with my representation of an apple into the 
form  the apple is red . 
 There are at least two ways in which Aquinas and Descartes differ on 
the issue of judgment. The fi rst difference concerns the nature of the object 
that receives the action. In the case of Aquinas, the objects of the action 
are the mental representations of the forms. They are joined together in 
such a way that one is predicated of the other. For Descartes, on the other 
hand, the object of the action is an idea, the content of which already has 
propositional structure. For example, in the case of thinking about a red 
apple, judgment for Aquinas is the process by which the concept  red is 
combined with the concept  apple . We judge of the apple that it is red. 
 An interesting result of this difference is that Descartes’s theory of judg-
ment allows for attitude to vary independently of content, whereas Aqui-
nas’s does not. For example, take the idea that the apple is red. We could 
affi rm or deny that very idea, on Descartes’s view, merely by changing 
the quality of our will with respect to it. But, for Aquinas, the actions of 
combining and separating are not directed at the bearers of propositions 
but at sub-propositional elements, and thus separating cannot be like judg-
ing a proposition to be false. What is more, separating cannot merely be 
refusing to combine. Not predicating redness of an apple is not the same 
as judging the proposition that the apple is red is false. A natural solution 
to this diffi culty for Aquinas would be to hold that separating is somehow 
like negation. For example, it would result in a judgment that it is not 
the case that the apple is red. The content of this judgment is, however, 
different from the content of the judgment that the apple is red. Thus, for 
Aquinas, unlike Descartes, attitude and content cannot vary independently. 
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 The second point of contrast is that judgment for Aquinas is an opera-
tion of the intellect alone, whereas, for Descartes, judgment requires the 
cooperation of the will, the same faculty that is responsible for purely 
conative attitudes such as wanting and fearing. This is a curious feature 
of Descartes’s account. Why think that the attitudes involved in wanting 
that  p and affi rming that  p are the products of the same faculty? 
 Descartes’s motivation is revealed by the context in which he introduces 
his theory of judgment. As mentioned previously, Descartes is concerned 
that the existence of a non-deceiving God is incompatible with the fact of 
human error. Descartes’s strategy for absolving God of guilt for our errors 
is to show that (1) he did not design us imperfectly in giving us the intellect 
that he did; (2) he did not design us imperfectly in giving us the will that 
he did; and (3) it lies within our control to use our will and intellect in a 
way that will never result in error. 
 Our intellect, Descartes argues, is perfect in its kind. We are, of course, 
fi nite beings, and as such there are many things about which we have no 
ideas. But we must, from Descartes’s perspective, distinguish between 
ideas that we merely lack and ideas that we ought to have but lack. If a 
lack of ideas is to count as a defect or privation, it would have to be the 
case that we should have ideas of these things. There is no reason to think, 
Descartes claims, that we should have ideas of everything. 8 After all, a 
craftsman, no matter how skilled, is under no obligation to include every-
thing in every design. Thus, this limitation is not a defect or privation. 
 We also have ideas, especially those deriving from sense experience, 
that are confused and obscure. But even these involve no error so long as 
we do not pass judgment on them. Therefore, that we have confused and 
obscure ideas does not, by itself, show that the design of our intellects is 
to blame for our errors. 
 Next, Descartes argues that our will, too, is perfect in its kind. Indeed, 
we are perfectly free because our ability to affi rm, deny, pursue, and avoid 
is not limited in any way. Of course, the manifestation of these attitudes 
in action is limited by our various cognitive and physical imperfections, 
but the attitudes themselves are not. It is in virtue of this unlimited power 
of will that we understand ourselves “to bear in some way the image and 
likeness of God”. 9  The divine will may be more effi cacious than ours in 
virtue of God’s greater knowledge or power, but with respect to the will 
considered in itself, ours is as perfect as his. 
 What remains to be shown is that God designed us in such a way that 
the interaction of will and intellect that results in judgment can always 
take place in a way that is free of error. That this is so is suggested by the 
rule that Descartes takes himself to have established in the Third Medita-
tion: whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true. Thus, if I only judge 
true what I clearly and distinctly perceive and in every other case suspend 
judgment, then I will never fall into error. Because judgment involves the 
application of the will, or freedom of choice, if I judge something true 
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that I did not clearly and distinctly perceive, the fault lies with me and 
not God. 10 
 Descartes’s theory of judgment has been criticized on many grounds, but 
perhaps the most serious is his claim that judgment involves the exercise 
of a free will. By affi rming that  p , I come to believe that  p . Thus, if affi r-
mation is a free volition, then what I believe is up to me. This has struck 
many commentators as implausible. 11 There are two main reasons for this. 
First, if belief were a matter of decision, then belief would be sensitive to 
practical reasons. Belief, however, is insensitive to practical reasons. For 
example, there is some amount of money that would make it prudent for 
me to believe that the moon was made of blue cheese, and yet there is no 
amount of money that, in reality, could get me to believe that the moon is 
made of blue cheese. It is simply not in my power to believe on such a basis. 
 Second, how I respond to considerations that do affect belief (i.e. epis-
temic reasons) does not appear to be under my control. For example, if, 
upon refl ection, I conclude that my reasons to believe that the number 
of grains of sand in the Sahara Desert is even are no greater or less than 
my reasons to believe it is odd, then it isn’t under my control whether or 
not to affi rm or deny either proposition. Of course, I can verbally affi rm 
or deny anything, and such an affi rmation or denial can be responsive to 
practical considerations or unresponsive to what I take to be my epistemic 
reasons for belief, but such verbal affi rmations or denials are not what 
Descartes is talking about. Rather, he is talking about the mental acts that 
such verbal affi rmations or denials express when they are sincere. 
 Now, in fairness to Descartes, he does allow that some reasons to 
believe are so powerful that I cannot but judge in accordance with them. 12 
Such judgments are still free for Descartes because he distinguishes free-
dom of indifference from freedom of spontaneity. For example, I do not 
experience freedom of indifference with respect to occurrent clear and 
distinct perception. Rather, the clarity and distinctness of that perception 
command my assent, just as perception of something good commands 
my desire. I do, however, still enjoy freedom of spontaneity because it is 
the nature of the will to seek the true and the good. Thus, ultimately, for 
Descartes, I choose what to believe. 
 My account of Descartes’s theory of judgment has assumed that, for 
him, the will’s control with respect to judgment is (1) direct rather than 
indirect and (2) includes affi rmation and denial rather than merely pass-
ing and suspending judgment. Both assumptions are controversial. With 
respect to (1), some commentators have claimed that the will’s infl uence 
over judgment is only indirect and is mediated by direct control over some 
other mental act—for example, selective attention. 13 With respect to (2), 
some commentators have argued that the will controls not affi rmation 
and denial but rather whether to pass or suspend judgment. 14 Once that 
decision is made, affi rmation and denial are determined by reasons for 
belief and not the will itself. 
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 My reasons for making these assumptions is that they are, in addition to 
being plausible readings of Descartes’s text, presupposed by Spinoza in his 
critique of Descartes, as we will see in the next section. Yet, as we will see, 
Spinoza’s ultimate reasons for rejecting Descartes’s theory of judgment 
are independent of these assumptions. Even if Descartes’s theory is that 
the will merely indirectly controls whether we pass or suspend judgment, 
Spinoza’s reasons for rejecting direct control over affi rmation and denial 
generalize to any theory on which the will has unconditional control over 
any mental act. 
 2. Spinoza on Judgment 
 Unlike in Descartes, there is no systematic development of a theory of 
judgment in Spinoza. Rather, there are a few unsystematic remarks strewn 
throughout part 2 of the  Ethics . Not only are these remarks unsystematic, 
but, as we will see, they are not suffi cient to explain the role that affi rma-
tion and judgment play in Spinoza’s psychology. I will argue, however, 
that it is possible to reconstruct a Spinozistic account of judgment from 
materials drawn from elsewhere in the  Ethics . 
 Let us begin by considering those remarks where Spinoza is principally 
concerned with criticizing Descartes’s account of judgment. He writes in 
2p48: 
 The Mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by 2p11), 
and so (by 1p17c2) cannot be a free cause of its own actions, or can-
not have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing. 
 This amounts to a rejection of Descartes’s doxastic voluntarism, the claim 
that what we decide to believe is up to us in the sense that it involves the 
exercise of a causally unconditioned faculty of free will. Spinoza’s reasons 
for rejecting it stem from what we might call his naturalism. He thinks 
that nature is uniform and that every natural phenomenon is governed by 
the same laws. This includes human beings. They are not, in his words, 
a “kingdom within a kingdom” that “disturbs, rather than follows, the 
order of nature”. 15 This entails that when someone affi rms a proposition, 
their action is governed by natural laws and conditioned by causal ante-
cedents that necessitate it. 
 His second objection is expressed in his claim that “the will and the 
intellect are one and the same”. 16 In other words, judgment does not 
involve two independent factors: the intellect, which allows us to under-
stand or consider some content, and the will, which ultimately judges the 
truth or falsity of that content. Rather, it is the same faculty by which we 
understand and affi rm a proposition. 
 But, as Spinoza’s discussion of this claim makes clear, his thesis is 
stronger than that a single faculty is responsible for judgment. Rather, 
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he believes the much more radical proposition that every idea is both 
simultaneously a representation of a proposition and the affi rmation of 
that proposition. Moreover, an affi rmation is nothing over and above the 
idea of the affi rmed content. In short, ideas and affi rmations are identical. 
On the face of it, this claim is highly counterintuitive. Surely we cognize 
propositions that we do not affi rm. For example, we can entertain propo-
sitions, the truth of which we deny or doubt. Why, then, does Spinoza 
believe this radical thesis, and how can he deal with the phenomenon of 
denial and doubt? 
 Spinoza’s offi cial argument for the claim that every idea is an affi rma-
tion (found in 2p49d) begins by saying that we can’t have an idea of a 
triangle without affi rming that the triangle is such that its interior angles 
are equal to two right angles, and that we can’t affi rm this proposition 
without having an idea of a triangle. Thus, the affi rmation of the proposi-
tion that a triangle is such that its interior angles equal two right angles is 
nothing over and above the idea of the triangle. Because, Spinoza claims, 
this example was selected at random, we can infer a universal generaliza-
tion: the affi rmation of any proposition is nothing over and above the idea 
of its subject; that is, affi rmations and ideas are identical. 
 There is much to criticize in this argument, but perhaps the most serious 
problem is that not every affi rmation is entailed by an idea of the subject 
of the proposition affi rmed. The claim that every affi rmation is identi-
cal to some idea should not be confused with the more plausible claim 
that every idea entails some affi rmation. This more plausible claim can 
be explicated with the following schema: for all  x , there is some  F  , such 
that  x is inconceivable unless  x is  F  is affi rmed. This would be true if, for 
example, we conceived of things via their essences, and doing so entails 
that we judge that things satisfy some essential description. Spinoza’s 
claim is, rather, the much more implausible claim that every affi rmation 
is such that its subject is inconceivable without that affi rmation. This is 
clearly false. For example, I affi rm the proposition that Paris is the capi-
tal of France, but it is not true that no one could have the idea of Paris 
without affi rming that it is the capital of France. 
 3. Belief, Affi rmation, and Conatus 
 Spinoza’s claim that every idea is an affi rmation appears to entail that 
every idea is believed because the affi rmation of a content is often thought 
to constitute or give rise to a belief. After all, on the face of it, I cannot 
affi rm that Paris is the capital of France without believing that Paris is 
the capital of France, at least so long as I affi rm it. But if every idea is an 
affi rmation, then, it is natural to think, every idea constitutes or gives rise 
to a belief. 17 
 The claim that every idea is a belief would be problematic for Spinoza 
for at least two reasons. First, Spinoza thinks that a mind can contain 
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ideas whose contents exclude one another. For example, Marlow might 
have an idea that represents Ms Wade as loving her husband and a dif-
ferent idea that represents her as not loving her husband. What is more, 
according to Spinoza, if one of these ideas is stronger (I will return to the 
question of what it means for one idea to be stronger than another pres-
ently) than the other, then it, and not the weaker, will determine behav-
iour. And yet, if every idea is a belief, then the weaker idea is still a belief 
despite not guiding behaviour. The weaker idea is, thus, likely to strike 
many philosophers as failing to satisfy the functional profi le of a belief. 
 Second, as Justin Steinberg has pointed out, Spinoza denies that all 
non-veridical ideas involve error. 18 For example, he says that the idea that 
the sun is two hundred feet away does not, in and of itself, constitute an 
error but does so only in a context where the possessor of this idea lacks 
a stronger idea of the true distance. Suppose someone has such a stronger 
idea of the true distance. If every idea were a belief, then they would 
believe that the sun was only two hundred feet away and not commit an 
error. It would be hard to make sense of Spinoza if this were his position. 
 Diane Steinberg has proposed an account of belief in Spinoza that 
denies that every idea is a belief. On her interpretation, all (and only) ideas 
that are stronger than ideas opposed to them are beliefs, where strength is 
characterized in terms of the power of the conatus of that idea. In other 
words,  S believes that  p just in case  S has an idea  i whose content is that  p 
and  i are stronger than any idea whose content excludes  p . 19 This account 
would explain why Spinoza thinks, for example, that a person who has 
an idea of the sun as two hundred feet away but also has a stronger idea 
of the true distance of the sun does not err. The person’s behaviour and 
subsequent thought are determined by the idea of the true distance and 
not by the idea of the sun as two hundred feet away, so it is natural to say 
that they believe the idea of the true distance, not the idea that represents 
it as closer than it really is. 
 But Steinberg’s proposal isn’t satisfactory either. If we concede that the 
notion of belief plays any role in Spinoza’s psychology (a point about 
which I’m sceptical, as I will explain presently), then a counterexample 
to her account can be found in Spinoza’s discussion of thoughts about the 
future. According to him, our ability to think about the future depends 
upon the association of ideas. If someone has an experience of  x and  y 
together, subsequent experiences of  x will cause thoughts about  y and 
vice versa. Similarly, if someone has experiences of fi rst  x and then  y , 
subsequent experiences of  x will cause thoughts about  y . He writes: 
 Let us suppose, then, a child, who saw Peter for the fi rst time yester-
day, in the morning, but saw Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening, 
and today again saw Peter in the morning. It is clear from 2p18 that 
as soon as he sees the morning light, he will immediately imagine 
the sun taking the same course through the sky as he saw on the 
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preceding day, or he will imagine the whole day, and Peter together 
with the morning, Paul with noon, and Simon with the evening. That 
is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and of Simon with a relation 
to future time. On the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he 
will relate Paul and Peter to the time past, by imagining them together 
with past time. And he will do this more uniformly, the more often he 
has seen them in this same order. 20 
 If I fi rst see Peter in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon at night and 
then, the next day, I see Peter in the morning, I will, in virtue of psychologi-
cal laws of association, automatically think of Paul at noon and Simon at 
night. But I will not think that Paul is currently present at noon because I 
have an idea of the sun being lower in the sky than it would be at noon. 
That idea is more powerful than the idea that represents the sun as hav-
ing its noon position, and their contents are metaphysically incompat-
ible. Therefore, the idea of Peter in the morning excludes the idea of Paul 
at noon. Assuming that Spinoza has a psychologically serious notion of 
belief, it seems natural to say that, although I will not believe that Paul is 
present at noon, I will,  ceteris paribus , believe that Paul  will be present at 
noon. This can be seen from the fact that I will act as if it were true that 
Paul will be present at noon. 
 This, however, does not fi t Steinberg’s model of belief in Spinoza. 
Recall that, on Steinberg’s interpretation,  S believes that  p just in case 
(1)  S has an idea that  p and (2)  S ’s idea that  p is stronger than any idea 
that  S has whose content excludes  p . The problem is that, in the scenario 
described by Spinoza in 2p44s, I have no idea whose content is that Paul 
will be present at noon. I have, instead, an idea whose content is that 
Paul is present at noon and ideas that are associated with it by a temporal 
sequence. If there is a belief that Paul will be present at noon, then it is 
this complex that represents that content and no one idea. (Perhaps it will 
be objected that this complex is itself a complex idea. But the ideas that 
would constitute this complex idea are, by hypothesis, contrary to one 
another, in that their contents are metaphysically incompatible. Things 
that are contrary to one another cannot be in the same subject [3p5]. 
As 3p10 makes clear, being contrary in the sense that their contents are 
incompatible is a way of being contrary governed by 3p5.) 
 I will return to the question of belief in Spinoza at the end of this 
section, but let us for now merely note the diffi culty of locating a 
plausible notion of belief in the context of his claim that every idea 
is affi rmed and turn now to the notion of affi rmation itself. Several 
recent commentators have tried to explicate this notion in terms of 
Spinoza’s conatus doctrine. According to the conatus doctrine, “each 
thing, in and of itself, strives to persevere in its being”. This means 
that all of nature—from the stars in the sky to the smallest particle of 
matter—is animated by an urge to self-preservation. Human beings are 
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no exception to this law, and Spinoza uses his conatus doctrine as the 
basis of his psychology. 
 The human mind, for Spinoza, is a complex idea that represents the 
human body. It is a complex idea, in that it has parts that are themselves 
ideas that represent parts of the human body. Because each of these con-
stituent ideas is, for Spinoza, a thing, they, too, strive for self-preservation. 
The conatus, or striving for self-preservation, of each thing is the ground 
of its causal powers. It determines both what something tends to do and 
how successful it will be if it is opposed by external causes. 
 Can Spinoza’s conatus doctrine be used to explain why Spinoza thinks 
that every idea is an affi rmation? Michael Della Rocca claims that every 
idea is an affi rmation, for Spinoza, because every idea is bound up in 
the conatus of the agent who possesses it—that is, produces effects that 
are benefi cial to the agent or that the agent regards as benefi cial unless 
prevented from doing so by other ideas. 21 He sees Spinoza as offering here 
both a theory of belief and affi rmation according to which every idea is 
both affi rmed and believed. 
 In a similar vein, Diane Steinberg has argued that every idea is an affi r-
mation because every idea strives to affi rm (i.e. preserve) the existence of 
its object. Steinberg, however, denies that every idea is a belief and argues 
that only an idea that is more powerful than any idea that excludes it is 
a belief. 
 Such proposals face a serious problem. As far as I can see, there is no 
way to analyse affi rmation as the manifestation of the conatus that retains 
the connection between affi rming an idea and the truth of that idea that 
Spinoza obviously intends it to have. He writes: 
 [B]y will I understand a faculty of affi rming and denying, and not 
desire. I say that I understand the faculty by which the Mind affi rms 
or denies something true or something false, and not the desire by 
which the mind wants a thing or avoids it. 22 
 It is clear from this passage that Spinoza thinks affi rmation is related to 
truth in such a way as distinguishes it from “the desire by which the mind 
wants something”. Efforts to understand affi rmation in terms of conatus, 
however, fail to preserve any connection to truth that distinguishes it in 
this way. Della Rocca’s interpretation fails because being such as to tend 
to produce effects that are benefi cial or regarded as such doesn’t distin-
guish affi rmation from desire. After all, desires often tend to produce 
effects that are benefi cial or regarded by me as benefi cial. For example, my 
desire that I eat leafy greens tends to produce effects that are benefi cial to 
me or are regarded by me as such. Thus, on Della Rocca’s interpretation, 
such a desire would be an affi rmation and, indeed, a belief. 
 Steinberg’s proposal faces a similar objection. According to her, every 
idea strives to affi rm (i.e. preserve) the existence of its object. 23 But to 
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see this as an account of judgment requires an equivocation on ‘affi rms’ 
because I can affi rm the existence of some object (that is, have a mind-
to-world directed attitude towards the proposition that it exists) without 
affi rming its existence (that is, striving to preserve its existence) and vice 
versa. For example, that I affi rm (in the sense that has a mind-to-world 
direction of fi t) the existence of my coffee cup does not entail that I will 
try to protect it from harm. And I can, for example, perform actions that 
will protect an as of yet unborn child from harm without affi rming that 
the child presently exists. The conatus doctrine only tells us that each idea 
affi rms its object in the sense of protecting-from-harm and not in the sense 
of taking-to-exist. 
 If the affi rmation is not reducible to the conatus of each idea or of 
each mind, why then does Spinoza believe that every idea is affi rmed? I 
propose that we can begin to fi nd the answer to this question by looking 
at Spinoza’s claim that all sense perception is affi rmed unless we have 
an imaginative idea (imagination, for Spinoza, as for most early mod-
erns, pertains to imagistic thoughts, which include sense perceptions) that 
excludes it. Spinoza writes: 
 If the human Body is affected with a mode that involves the nature 
of an external body, the human Mind will regard the same external 
body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the Body is affected 
by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body. 24 
 Although it is not immediately obvious, this text concerns sense percep-
tion because an idea of a state of the body that has an external cause 
(“involves the nature of an external body”) constitutes, according to 
2p16c1, sense perception of that cause. But Spinoza says that not only 
do we have sense perception of the external cause but we also judge it to 
exist (“the human mind will regard the same external body as actually 
existing”). That is, every perceptual idea entails an affi rmation of the 
proposition that the object of the idea exists. 
 His reasons for thinking this derive from his account of intentionality. 
According to him, there are two sources of intentionality. There is the 
primitive underived intentionality by which every idea represents the 
body to which it is identical. There is also derivative intentionality that 
has a causal/informational basis. If the body is in a state that has an 
external cause, then the idea of the body represents that state and also 
the external cause in virtue of the fact that the state carries information 
about the cause. This is the kind of causal/informational intentionality 
that allows us to infer fi re from smoke and the age of a tree from the 
number of rings in its trunk. When we are in a state that implies the exis-
tence of an external cause (via causal/informational connections), we 
will represent that cause as existing unless we receive new information 
that tells us the cause no longer exists. This new information is encoded 
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in a state of the body, which is incompatible with the present existence 
of the cause of the previous state. 
 Spinoza’s argument for 2p17 is revealing. He writes: 
 Dem: For whatever happens in the object of any idea, the knowl-
edge of that thing is necessarily in God (by 2p9c), insofar as he is 
considered to be affected by the idea of the same object, i.e. (by 
2p11), insofar as he constitutes the mind of something. Therefore, 
whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human 
Mind, the knowledge of it is necessarily in God insofar as he consti-
tutes the nature of the human Mind, i.e. (by 2p11c), knowledge of 
this thing will necessarily be in the Mind, or the Mind will perceive 
it, q.e.d. 
 In this demonstration, Spinoza says that the human mind is God’s idea of the 
human body—that is, the idea that constitutes knowledge of the body in the 
divine intellect. This being so, the idea of the body in God’s intellect—that 
is, the mind—must be affi rmed because, presumably, knowing that  p entails 
affi rming that  p . But how should we understand affi rmation so that every 
idea, whether it is related to God’s mind or ours, is affi rmed, yet not every 
false idea in the human mind constitutes an error? 
 My proposal for making sense of Spinoza’s remarks on truth and 
affi rmation has been prefi gured by my criticisms of attempts to reduce 
affi rmation to conatus. It is simply to read him as specifying the direction 
of fi t that pertains to ideas. On this interpretation, the intended contrast 
between “affi rming [. . .] something true” and “the desire by which the 
mind wants a thing” is that which obtains between that which purports 
to represent the world as it really is and that which doesn’t. Moreover, 
construing the connection between affi rmation and truth as specifying a 
mind-to-world direction of fi t allows Spinoza’s claim that every idea is 
affi rmed to be consistent with his claim that not every false idea consti-
tutes an error. There is no error in merely having a false mental repre-
sentation with a mind-to-world direction of fi t. This general point could 
be illustrated by the case of credences. Credences have a mind-to-world 
direction of fi t, and yet I commit no error simply in virtue of having 
nonzero credences towards false propositions. For example, I commit no 
error if I evenly distribute my credences between the propositions that the 
fair coin will land heads and that the fair coin will land tails, although 
one of them is false. 
 Although this answers the challenge of characterizing affi rmation, seri-
ous diffi culties remain. Just as Descartes faces the problem of showing 
how human error is compatible with the existence of a perfect God, so, 
too, does Spinoza face a similar problem. If our minds are fragments of 
God’s infi nite intellect, every idea of which constitutes knowledge of the 
world, how can we account for attitudes such as doubt and denial in the 
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human mind? A similar problem arises for error and misrepresentation, 
and consideration of how Spinoza addresses it will shed light on how 
Spinoza tries to account for doubt and denial. 
 According to Spinoza, “[a]ll ideas, insofar as they are related to God, 
are true” and “there is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they 
are called false” because all ideas are modes of God. If there were ideas 
that were false in and of themselves, then God would have false ideas, 
which is incompatible with divine omniscience—or, as Spinoza would put 
it, it would be incompatible with the fact that “whatever follows formally 
from God’s infi nite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in 
the same order and with the same connection”. 25 And yet, this claim 
appears to be incompatible with the claim, which Spinoza endorses, that 
the human mind is an idea in God and that human minds can commit 
errors and misrepresent the world. Spinoza’s solution is that a given idea 
can be false relative to the human mind 26 and true relative to God. 27 He 
illustrates this with an example of an idea that represents the sun as being 
two hundred feet away. 28 This idea is false only if it occurs in a mind that 
lacks knowledge of the true distance of the sun. A human mind can both 
have an idea of the sun being two hundred feet away and lack knowledge 
of the true distance of the sun, but God cannot. Therefore, an idea that 
represents the sun as two hundred feet away can be false in a human mind 
but cannot be false in God. 
 Whether or not Spinoza’s account of falsity succeeds is a diffi cult ques-
tion that I cannot take up here. Rather, I would simply like to note that 
Spinoza’s treatment of attitudes other than affi rmation, such as doubt and 
denial, is structurally similar. First of all, just as there is nothing positive in 
an idea in virtue of which it is not true, so, too, there is nothing positive 
in an idea in virtue of which it is not affi rmed. And just as falsity results 
from the interaction between ideas, there is evidence that Spinoza thinks 
that attitudes such as denial and doubt result from the interaction between 
ideas. For example, he gives the example of a child imagining a winged 
horse and not perceiving anything else. In this circumstance, he claims 
that the child will regard the horse as present. He writes: 
 For if the Mind perceived nothing else except the winged horse, it 
would regard it as present to itself, and would not have any cause 
of doubting its existence, or any faculty of dissenting, unless either 
the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea which 
excluded the existence of the same horse, or the Mind perceived that 
its idea of a winged horse was inadequate. And then either it will 
necessarily deny the horse’s existence, or it will necessarily doubt it. 29 
 In this text, Spinoza clearly states that we deny or doubt an idea  x only 
if, in addition to idea  x , we possess an idea  y whose content excludes the 
content of idea  x (in the case of denial) or we possess an idea  z whose 
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content entails that idea  x is inadequate (in the case of doubt). This states 
a necessary condition on doubt and denial. (Diane Steinberg objects that 
all of our perceptual ideas are inadequate, and thus, upon recognizing 
this, Spinoza’s theory predicts that we suspend judgment, which strikes 
her as implausible. 30 But Spinoza says that  doubt results from this rec-
ognition and says nothing about suspension of judgment. 31 Doubt, for 
Spinoza, is the state of being less than certain about something, which 
he also thinks is the correct attitude to take towards the deliverances of 
the senses.) 
 Are there other conditions that must be in place for us to doubt or 
deny? Presumably yes because if we take  exclusion to be a relation of 
logical or metaphysical incompatibility, then it is symmetric; that is, both 
ideas exclude each other. 32 But in typical cases of denial, the idea that 
causes me to deny something is not itself denied. For example, if I have a 
perceptual idea that represents the distance of the sun as two hundred feet 
away and I have another idea that causes me to doubt it, say an idea that 
represents the true distance of the sun, then I deny the misrepresentation 
precisely because I don’t doubt the true one. 
 At this point, I think that we can make use of the conatus to determine 
which cognitive attitude will obtain. Thus, like some of the accounts that 
we considered earlier and rejected, my account will appeal to Spinoza’s 
conatus doctrine, but unlike those accounts, my account does not reduce 
affi rmation to the conatus or the causal powers of an idea. Rather, my 
proposal is that the conatus associated with an idea pushes towards 
actions that would conduce to self-preservation if the idea were true, 
including imaginative content that doesn’t represent the body parallel 
to the idea but rather the external causes responsible for its state. That 
is, the conatus takes an idea to be affi rmed and determines us to act 
appropriately. When ideas confl ict, their actions can generate attitudes 
of doubt and denial. 
 Before explaining exactly how this works, it will be useful to review 
a few details of Spinoza’s theory of individuals and how it relates to the 
conatus doctrine. Let us begin by considering body under the attribute 
of extension and then apply the theory of complex individuality that 
Spinoza develops to modes under the attribute of thought. For Spinoza, 
simple bodies can join together to form complex bodies if they commu-
nicate their motions to one another according to a fi xed pattern. 33 What 
is more, a complex body can lose parts and still survive if those parts 
are replaced by functional equivalents. 34 That is, both mereology and 
identity through change are determined by functional or causal proper-
ties. The resulting complex bodies can themselves be parts of even more 
complex bodies if their motions similarly realize a fi xed pattern. There is, 
according to Spinoza, a hierarchy of increasingly complex bodies—each 
of which satisfi es this condition—that terminates with a single super-
individual that has every simpler body as a part. 35 The human mind, 
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according to Spinoza, is the idea of the human body, and every idea is 
identical to the body that it represents. Thus, the human mind and the 
human body are identical. 36 The human body is a complex body that 
has many simpler bodies as parts that are bound together by their func-
tional organization. Similarly, the human mind is a complex idea that has 
many simpler ideas as parts that are bound together by their functional 
organization. 37 
 On this picture, the natural world is composed of a great many indi-
viduals at many different levels of complexity. Spinoza’s conatus doctrine 
says that each thing strives to persevere in its being. 38 Because each of 
these individuals at each level of complexity is something in its own right, 
they exhibit this striving for self-preservation. But to the extent that they 
are parts of a more complex whole, their actions coincide with and are 
regulated by the striving of that more complex whole of which they are 
parts. For example, the human heart is both an individual with its own 
functional organization and part of the human body. As a genuine indi-
vidual, the human heart strives to preserve its own functional organiza-
tion and contributes to the human being’s striving to preserve its own 
functional organization. 
 Now we are in a position to see how Spinoza could use his conatus 
doctrine to generate attitudes of denial and doubt from a collection 
of ideas that, insofar as they are in themselves and insofar as they are 
related to God’s mind, are all affi rmed. Each idea, insofar as it is in 
itself, is affi rmed because it has a mind-to-world direction of fi t and 
determines, in virtue of its conatus, mental actions that would result in 
its self-preservation if its content were true. But insofar as they are parts 
of a mind that contains ideas that confl ict with them, their actions will 
be transformed as a result of a struggle between them and their rivals. 
The outcome of this struggle will, in turn, be determined by the relative 
strength of those ideas. The relative strength of each idea is a matter 
of the conatus of each and the conatus of the mind of which they are 
parts. Insofar as an idea is part of a mind, what would preserve itself 
coincides with what would preserve the mind. But, insofar as an idea is 
a passion, its interests can diverge from those of the mind to which it 
belongs. It cannot, of course, destroy the mind because Spinoza thinks 
that nothing can destroy that in which it inheres, 39 but it could seek to 
produce effects that result in the continued existence of the mind at a 
suboptimal degree of power. 40 
 This divergence of interests can generate mental confl ict that grounds 
attitudes such as denial and doubt. Denial results from an idea, which 
in itself is affi rmed, being joined to ideas that exclude it (that is, their 
contents are logically or metaphysically incompatible with its content), 
that are stronger than it. Because of the weakness of the denied idea 
relative to the strength of the ideas that exclude it, the net result of their 
combined power is action that would conduce to the survival of the mind 
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of which it is a part if its content were false. Doubt results from an idea 
being joined to stronger ideas whose contents entail that it is inadequate. 
Because of the relative weakness of the denied idea, the net result of its 
struggle with the ideas that indicate its inadequacy is action that would 
conduce to the survival of the mind of which it is a part if its content may 
or may not be true. 
 In other words, doubt and denial are the result of a struggle between 
ideas, all of which purport to represent the world as it is. In themselves, 
they produce actions that would be benefi cial to themselves and to the 
mind of which they are parts if they were true, but, in combination with 
each other, they produce actions that are determined by the net force that 
results from each of their individual strivings. In this way, affi rmation 
begets denial and doubt. 
 This account of affi rmation, denial, and doubt entails that, whereas 
affi rmation is fundamentally a subpersonal phenomenon, denial and 
doubt occur only at the level of human mind. (We can, of course, say of 
a mind that it affi rms an idea, but this just means that it has an idea that 
is not denied or doubted. Nothing new need take place at the personal 
level for a mind to affi rm an idea.) Ideas that are doubted or denied at the 
personal level are still affi rmed at the subpersonal level. Those ideas still 
purport to represent the world as it really is, but their voices are drowned 
out by rival ideas. The mind containing them does not affi rm them insofar 
as it doubts or denies them, but at the subpersonal level they are, as it 
were, still arguing their case. 
 Earlier, we considered some accounts of belief in Spinoza and found 
them wanting. Having explained what affi rmation is, for Spinoza, can 
we leverage this account of affi rmation to give an account of belief? 
I am pessimistic about the prospects for doing so because I suspect 
that the ordinary conception of belief is irreducibly normative and 
such notions do not easily fi t into Spinoza’s system. To see why belief 
might be normative, consider the diffi culty of defi ning belief according 
to its functional role—that is, having certain inputs and outputs. For 
example, we might attempt to defi ne belief as something that is formed 
on the basis of evidence and guides action. But this will not do because 
some of our beliefs are formed not on the basis of evidence but wishful 
thinking, and sometimes our actions are not guided by our beliefs but 
by representational states whose truth we do not endorse, as when we 
refuse to step out onto the glass fl oor of the CN tower despite believing 
the fl oor is strong and will not break. Rather, beliefs  ought to be formed 
on the basis of evidence and  ought to guide our action. I suspect similar 
problems will arise with any attempt to defi ne belief in non-normative 
terms. 
 The normativity of belief makes it diffi cult to square with Spinoza’s 
philosophy of mind. Spinoza’s philosophy is sometimes described as natu-
ralistic because he thinks that all phenomena can be understood in terms 
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of inviolable natural laws that are always and everywhere the same. Such 
naturalism is not a hospitable environment for the normative because 
natural law tells us what must happen given certain causal antecedents 
and not what ought to happen. Accordingly, Spinoza’s treatment of nor-
mative concepts such as perfection and imperfection, good and evil, and 
just and unjust reduces them to descriptive, non-normative elements. This 
strongly suggests that nature, for Spinoza, is ultimately non-normative. 
Thus, if belief is indeed an irreducibly normative notion, as I suspect it 
is, then Spinoza’s naturalistic philosophy of mind is not well-suited to 
accommodate it. Indeed, although Spinoza sometimes speaks of belief in 
passing, in the principal source of his psychological views, the  Ethics , he 
never refers to it in rigorous formulations of his psychological principles. 
This being so, I propose that we abandon the attempt to defi ne a Spi-
nozistic notion of belief from his views of seemingly related topics such 
as affi rmation, denial, and doubt and accept that Spinoza’s psychology 
is belief-free. 
 Conclusion 
 I have argued that both Descartes’s and Spinoza’s theories of judgment 
result from their attempts to reconcile the fact of human error with the 
existence of a perfect God. The problem is particularly acute for Spinoza 
because the human mind is not only produced by God but is also, indeed, 
a part of the infi nite intellect and constitutes God’s knowledge of the 
human body. For this reason, Spinoza thinks that every idea is affi rmed, 
which I have argued means that every idea purports to represent the world 
as it really is. Thus, just as there is nothing positive in an idea in virtue 
of which it is false, so, too, there is nothing positive in them in virtue of 
which they are denied or doubted. Similarly, just as every idea is true 
relative to God’s mind, so, too, is every idea affi rmed relative to God’s 
mind. Insofar as they are related to the human mind, however, ideas can 
be denied or doubted. These cognitive attitudes emerge from the interplay 
of ideas that are, in themselves, affi rmed. This means that some ideas are 
simultaneously affi rmed and denied or doubted. This is possible because 
affi rmation and doubt and denial are phenomena occurring, in the fi rst 
instance, at different levels. Doubt and denial attach to ideas at the level 
of the human mind, whereas affi rmation is essentially at once subpersonal 
and divine. (The relationship between how things are  quantum in se est 
and how things are in relation to God is a complex topic. Exploring 
this further would require an in-depth discussion of Spinoza’s notions 
of eternity, duration, and perception  sub specie aeternitatis , which I can-
not undertake here.) Because it is subpersonal, and so is consistent with 
denial and doubt, I have argued that affi rmation, in Spinoza, should be 
understood as a technical notion that is unconnected to folk-psychological 
notions such as belief. 
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 Abbreviations and Conventions 
 Passages of Spinoza’s  Ethics are cited in the following way: app = appendix; 
a = axiom; c = corollary; d = demonstration or defi nition depending on 
context; p = proposition; s = scholium. 
 AT Descartes, R.,  Oeuvres de Descartes , ed. Charles Adam and 
Paul Tannery. 
 CSM Descartes, R.,  The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , ed. 
J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch. 
 ST Aquinas, Thomas,  Summa Theologiae . 
 Notes 
 1 . AT VII 35/CSM II 24. 
 2 . AT VII 35–36/CSM II 25. 
 3 . AT VII 54/CSM II 38. 
 4 . AT VII 36–37/CSM II 25–26. 
 5 . AT VII 37/CSM II 26. 
 6 . ST I.75.6; 85.2. 
 7 . ST I.16.2. 
 8 . AT VII 56–57; CSM II 39–40. 
 9 . AT VII 57; CSM II 40. 
 10 . AT VII 59–60; CSM II 41. 
 11 . Williams (2005 : 162–3),  Curley (1975 : 177–8),  Wilson (1978 : 127). 
 12 . AT VII 58–59; CSM II 41. 
 13 . Della Rocca (2006 ). 
 14 . Schüssler (2013 ). 
 15 . E3pref. 
 16 . 2p49c. 
 17 . Della Rocca (2003 : 207). 
 18 . J.  Steinberg (2018 ). 
 19 . D.  Steinberg (2005 : 151). 
 20 . 2p44s. 
 21 . Della Rocca (2003 : 209). 
 22 . 2p48s. 
 23 . D.  Steinberg (2005 : 154). 
 24 . 2p17. 
 25 . 2p7c. 
 26 . 2p36d. 
 27 . 2p32, 2p32d, 2p33, 2p33d. 
 28 . 2p35s. 
 29 . 2p49s. 
 30 . D.  Steinberg (2005 : 408–9). 
 31 . 2p49s. 
 32 . See D.  Steinberg (2005 : 151). 
 33 . Defi nition following A´´ of the  Short Physical Digression following 2p13s. 
 34 . L4 following A3 of the  Short Physical Digression . 
 35 . L7s of the  Short Physical Digression . 
 36 . 1p7s. 
 37 . 2p14. 
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 38 . 3p6. 
 39 . 3p4. 
 40 . 3p11s. 
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